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Fault tree analysis, which has proved to be a
useful analytical tool for the reliability and safety
analysis of complex systems, is applied to the Naval
Postgraduate School Mini-Satellite (ORION). A general
background to reliability analysis, fault tree
analysis, and fault tree construction is given. Impact
of a phased mission is included in the analysis. A
fault tree for ORION is constructed and used to
identify minimal cut sets and minimal path sets. The
cuts sets and path sets are, in turn, used to calculate
an estimate of ORION'S reliability to perform a three
year mission. The reliability model was constructed in
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A. GENERAL BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
The Naval Postgraduate School Mini-Satellite
(subsequently referred to as ORION) is an actual
engineering effort by the students and faculty of the
Naval Postgraduate School to produce a low cost, multi-
purpose satellite. The focus of this thesis, as a
portion of that effort, is to derive a fault tree for
ORION and assist in its design by identifying weak
links in its system reliability. The format of the
thesis is intended to make the results of this analysis
readily accessible to colleagues to facilitate the
design and construction of ORION.
B. SATELLITE OVERVIEW
ORION is an alternative concept for low cost
military spaceflight. It is designed to be an
inexpensive, reliable satellite bus that can be mission
specific, yet maintain a flexible architecture. The
mission payloads can vary from 50 lbs. to 130 lbs. and
are designed for a mission life of three years. Due to
its simplistic design, ORION includes very little
redundancy
.
1 . Objectives of ORION
ORION is designed with eight objectives in
mind. They are:
a. to satisfy many small mission needs with a low
cost, reconfigurable vehicle.
b. to provide an affordable, boosted-free flyer to
complement SPARTAN and SPAS 1 .
1 SPARTAN and SPAS are existing experimental
orms used by the Shuttle. The
long as the Shuttle is on station.
platf y are on station as
Lt :
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c. to achieve circular orbits from 135 nm (nautical
miles) to 800 nm with propellant reserve.
d. to achieve elliptic orbits to 2200 nm with a
perigee of 135 nm.
e. to have a longer life at Shuttle altitude than
SPARTAN .
f. to provide an affordable platform for space
science, space technology, and military missions.
g. to provide a cost effective bus for constellation
prol iferation
.




For purposes of management and design, ORION
can be separated into seven subsystems. The subsystems
are :
a. the propulsion subsystem.
b. the electrical power subsystem.
c. the data storage subsystem.
d. the telemetry subsystem.
e. the thermal control subsystem.
f
.
the attitude control subsystem.
g. the computer subsystem.
The reliability analysis focuses on how the
subsystems interrelate. As an example, all the
subsystems require the electrical power subsystem to
work. These dependency relationships are developed and




Due to ORION's objectives and simplistic
design, there are several apparent military
applications. Some of those applications include:
a. proliferated platforms for communication.
b. ultraviolet sensor platforms.
c. high energy particle detectors.
d
.
targeting laser or KE (kinetic energy)
weapons, reentry vehicle simulator, or kill
assessment
.
e. low cost imaging platforms.
C. ORGANIZATION
This chapter provides some background to ORION and
its possible applications. Chapter II gives a short
background of reliability analysis. Chapter III follows
with a description of fault tree analysis. Chapter IV
contains the applications of a fault tree analysis to
ORION. The final chapter, Chapter V, states the





The primary benefit of this analysis has been to
aid in the design of ORION. This was accomplished by
identifying 82 minimal cut sets. Of these cut sets 22
are single-element sets, 29 are double-element cut
sets, 27 are three-element cut sets, 2 are five-element
cut sets, 1 is a six-element cut set and 1 is an
eleven-element cut set.
The dual tree reveals over 33 billion distinct
paths. Using modular decomposition this number is
reduced to three distinct paths. The path sets were
used to determine the structural importance of each
component
.
The structural importance analysis determined seven
different levels of significance. Twenty components are
structurally the most significant. A listing of them is
given in Appendix C. The remaining levels and their
associated components are listed in Chapter IV.
10
The reliability importance of components cannot be
determined since the design is not completely
established. A Lotus spreadsheet was developed to allow
the designers to do a "what-if" analysis with component
reliabilities as the subsystems are developed.
11
II. BACKGROUND TO RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
A salesman called on Steinway & Sons to show them a
new piano-key pin. "My company believes this aluminum
pin is greatly superior to the pin you have been
using , " he said
.
Mr. Steinway deliberated for some moments. "Well,
young man," he said at last, "we are an old firm, slow
and cautious about making changes. But we will install
your pins in one of our pianos and give them a trial."
The salesman was delighted. "That's good enough for
me," he said. "How long a trial will you need?"
"Oh," said Mr. Steinway thoughtfully, "I'd say
about 50 years." [Ref. 1]
A . GENERAL
Performing the mission is undoubtedly the best test
of reliability. However, today's decision makers and
analysts rarely have Mr. Steinway 's luxury of time. Not
only is time a scarce resource, but there are many
cases when neither the system's working or living
environment nor the money to do extensive or realistic
reliability tests is available. With such constraints,
other methods must be employed to estimate
reliabilities or limits on reliabilities. Reliability,
in the sense used here and throughout the thesis, is
the probability of a device performing its function
adequately for a specified length of time and operating
conditions. Therefore, the purpose of reliability or
system analysis is to seek out those reliabilities or
limits on reliabilities. Within that pursuit, there are
two important aspects to a system analysis: (1) an
12
inductive analysis stage and (2) a deductive analysis
stage
.
During the inductive analysis stage, available
information on the system is gathered and organized.
The system is then defined, its functional purpose de-
scribed, and its critical components determined. At
this stage, the question is posed "What can happen to
the system as a result of component failure or human
error?" Possible system failure modes are then hypo-
thesized. A failure modes and effects analysis is
conducted at the component level. Specifically, a list
of all envisioned mechanical and electrical failure
modes is generated. This, in turn, leads to a critical
components list including assessed failure rates.
Additionally, it is well known that system failures
often occur at subsystem interfaces. The interfaces,
therefore, become an important part of the analysis
along with the components.
The deductive analysis of a system or reliability
analysis answers the question "How can a system fail
(or succeed) or be unavailable?" A logic tree (or fault
tree) is often the best device for deducing how a major
system failure event could occur. However, its
construction depends on a thorough understanding of the
system and the results of the system inductive
analysis. A block diagram or a network graph is a
useful device for representing a successfully
functioning system. Since the network graph is close to
a system functional representation, it cannot capture
abstract system failure and human error events as well
as the logic tree representation. [Ref. 2: pp. 1-2]
Also during the deductive stage a particular method
of analysis must be selected and employed. Some of
those methods include: fault tree analysis; state space
approach; decomposition method; circuit stress
13
analysis; network reduction technique; block diagrams;
and Monte Carlo simulation. Each has its advantages and
disadvantages. The primary reason fault tree analysis
was selected is that ORION is still in its design stage
and fault tree analysis is particularly beneficial in
developing a design.
B. PHASED MISSIONS
Phases of deployment affect a satellite's
reliability. A phase change occurs whenever the size of
the set of active components changes. Another way to
look at this is to say the functional organization of
the system changes with time. During each phase of the
mission the system must accomplish a specified task.
A phased mission profile causes complexities not
present in a single-phase system. However, it can be
transformed into an equivalent synthetic single-phase
system. This refined profile can then be used to derive
an approximation of, or bounds on, mission or satellite
reliability.
It is inappropriate to do a standard reliability
analysis for each separate phase, and then multiply the
resulting phase reliabilities together as if they
referred to independent events. The implicit assump-
tion, that each component is functioning at the
beginning of a phase when the system has functioned
throughout the previous phase, is not necessarily true.
[Ref. 3: pp. 11, 12] A component must have survived the
first n-1 phases before it can function in the ntn
phase. Additionally, through the sequence of phases, a
component or set of components may be turned on and off
several times during the first n-1 phases before it is
needed during the n*-*1 phase. These are all reasons
the phase reliabilities cannot be merely multiplied
together to obtain an overall system reliability. A
14





A system with two independent
components, C^ and C2 , is designed for a two-phased
mission. In order for the system to perform the
required tasks, at least one component has to function
through phase 1 and both components have to function
through phase 2. The block diagrams for this system is
phase 1 phase 2
For k=l,2, let p^i denote the probability that
component C^ functions through phase 1, and p^2 denote
the conditional probability that component C^ functions
through phase 2, given that it has functioned through
phase 1. The system reliability for phase 1 is
Pi = Pll + P21 ~ PllP21» anc* t ^ie system reliability for
phase 2, given that both the components have functioned
through phase 1, is P2 = P12P22* Multiplying these
together would lead to the mission reliability
P " (Pll + P21 - P11P21 )P2lP22
This is greater than the correct mission reliability,
which is
PllPl2P2lP22
since mission success is achieved only if both compo-




An additional complication to phased missions is
the absence of an exact mission profile for ORION.
Since ORION is designed to be a low-cost general
purpose bus for an electronics package, it can be
employed in an infinite variety of profiles. For
purposes of this analysis, two distinct profiles are
analyzed
.
The first mission profile envisions a 3-axis
stabilized sensor platform that does not experience an
orbit change. After the satellite has been ejected from
the canister it becomes autonomous. A short time delay
is needed before ORION begins its mission profile. The
time delay is necessary to insure ORION is sufficiently
away from the Shuttle before it becomes active. This






The purpose of the activation phase is to "wake up"
ORION and conduct internal checks to insure ORION is
functioning. The antenna deployment phase is completed
when the antenna booms are locked in the extended
position. The specific mission of the orientation phase
is to establish ORION's spatial and orbital orienta-
tion. The fourth phase may or may not occur. If it is
determined that ORION is not properly oriented then re-
orientation is essential. This phase includes any
necessary re-orientation commands. The final phase
ensures ORION maintains the orbit(s) specified by its
mission profile. All of ORION's subsystems are required
(i.e. must function) to perform station keeping tasks.
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The second mission profile is for a spin stabilized
satellite with an orbit change. Such a profile is
characteristic of a communications satellite. This
profile has nine phases with the same four initial
phases as the first mission profile (i.e. activation,
antenna boom deployment, orientation and re-






The purpose of the orbit boost phase is to accelerate
ORION out of its low earth orbit. The orbit fix phase
establishes ORION'S mission orbit. The remaining three
phases are identical in purpose to the final three
phases of the first mission profile. Again, all of
ORION'S subsystems must function to perform station
keeping tasks.
In both mission profiles (or in any mission profile
generated) the last phase utilizes all of the satel-
lite's subsystems. Since all subsystems are needed
during the last phase, the phased mission analysis
dictates that every subsystem must survive the entire
mission life. The resulting synthetic single-phase is
all the subsystems operating in series during the
entire length of the mission.
17
III. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION
A. BACKGROUND TO FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
The bulk of this chapter is a compilation of
information extracted from reliability literature. It
is included here only to give the reader a background
to the fault tree reliability analysis performed in
this thesis.
The fault tree method resulted from a contract
between the Air Force Ballistics Division and Bell
Telephone Laboratories for the study of an inadvertent
launch of the Minuteman ICBM. The Launch Control Safety
Study (1962) first described fault tree analysis in
Volume I Section VII "Method of Inadvertent Launch
Control Analysis." Minuteman I was in production when
the study was completed, therefore no design changes
resulted from the study (effecting design changes has
become a primary advantage of fault tree analysis).
Because the results of the analysis were so close to
the observed data of Minuteman I, fault tree analysis
was used during the design phase of Minuteman II. Since
then, fault tree analysis has been used in combination
with other techniques to predict and improve safety
performance and reliability in complex aerospace and
military systems.
After initial work at Bell Telephone Laboratories,
development of the fault tree method continued at the
Boeing Company, where the technique was applied to
manned spacecraft. Boeing and AVCO published fault tree
reports on the Minuteman II system in March 1963, and
January 1964, respectively. In June 1965, Boeing and
the University of Washington co-sponsored a System
Safety Symposium in Seattle. Five of the presentations
18
were fault tree articles by Boeing employees. A paper
by A. B. Mearns of Bell Telephone Laboratories also
described fault trees. These six papers and the Launch
Control Safety Study are the main references cited in
articles after 1965. [Ref. 4: p. 3]
Fault tree analysis consists of six steps:
1. define the top event to be investigated,
2. gain an understanding of the system,
3. construct the tree,
4. collect quantitative data,
5. evaluate the probability of the top event,
and
6. analyze the results.
The top event of the tree should be well defined in
terms of operating modes of the system, environmental
conditions and time limits. However, the failure must
represent a major system malfunction which threatens
personnel or equipment.
Generally accepted symbols are necessary to
represent differences in events and logic relationships
since the fault tree is graphic as well as analytic. In
addition, several people at separate locations and at
different times may contribute to the analysis. The
following sections describe events, logic gates and
special symbols.
Instead of being hardware oriented, fault tree
analysis is even t or failure oriented; that is, it
examines a particular system failure for all possible
causes. Control of the system failure through knowledge
of its causes is the analysis objective. The tree is a
graphical representation of possible causes of a major
failure which appears at the top of the tree (called
the top event). During construction, the tree grows
downward and outward as failures and causes are
described in increasing detail. When the tree is
19
completed, probabilities are associated with the
failures lowest on the tree. The bottom events concern
failures of basic components which can be associated
with probabilities. The assigned probabilities are
combined as dictated by logic gates to give
probabilities for events higher on the tree. The
combination of probabilities continues until the
complex top event has a probability calculated from the
accurate component data at the bottom of the tree. In
general, fault tree analysis involves two kinds of
reasoning: the thought processes involved in
construction produce a downward flow, whereas the
evaluation of probability and operation of the logic
gates dictate an upward flow. [Ref. 4: pp. 1,6,7] See
Figure 3.1 for an example of a fault tree.
B. PURPOSE OF FAULT TREES
Generally, fault trees serve three purposes.
First, they aid in determining the possible causes
of a system failure. When properly used, the fault tree
often leads to discovery of failure combinations which
otherwise might not have been recognized as causes of
the top event
.
Secondly, they serve as a display of results. If
the system design is not adequate, the fault tree can
be used to show what the weak points are and how they
lead to undesirable events. If the design is
adequate, the fault tree can be used to show that all
conceivable causes have been considered.
Lastly, they provide a convenient and efficient
format helpful in the computation of the probability of
system failure. [Ref. 5: p. 10]
20
Bottom Events
Figure 3.1 Example of a Fault Tree
21
C. ASSUMPTIONS
In selecting fault tree analysis as the analysis
tool, some assumptions had to be made. Fault tree
analysis requires each c omponent to be either in a go
or no-go status^. Typically, a spacecraft has functional
states which are considered as degraded. During the
design of ORION, subsystems were engineered for more
than just their design envelope. An example is the
propulsion system. More fuel than an extreme mission
profile would require is designed into ORION. As such,
a true degradation will exist in the working environ-
ment (i.e. fuel is used throughout the mission and its
tank is not always full), and the propulsion system is
considered to either work or not work.
System components are assumed to have statistically
independent lives_. No component can be repaired or
replaced, and each component has a finite life. [Ref.
6: p. 10] As with the components, only two states of
the system are recognized, functioning or failed. It is
assumed throughout this thesis that the state of the
system (i.e. functioning or failed) is completely
determined by the states of its components.
Each component will be tested prior to installation
and again after installation to insure the system
functions properly. The total test time for every
component will be at least 500 hours. During these
tests the components will have an opportunity to fail
and be replaced. If after all the tests the component
is still functioning, it is assumed it will face a
constant failure rate during its mission life. This
assumption means the exponential distribution will be
used in determining a component's survival probability.
The physical structure of the satellite will
undergo stresses and strains. Throughout the analysis
it is assumed the satellite will not be stressed
22
outside of Its design envelope. This means no component
will experience loads greater than or equal to its
elastic limit. Additionally, no part will experience
fatigue failure due to cyclic mechanical or thermal
stress loading. It is also assumed the shared stress
environment creates associated components. The concept
of association will be addressed later.
All basic events are assumed to be relevant to the
event tree. This means each basic event appears in the
union of the min cut sets. A formal definition of
relevant components is presented in Section J of this
chapter
.
D. ADVANTAGES OF FAULT TREES
There are some distinct advantages of fault tree
analysis that make it particularly suited for the
reliability analysis of ORION. These advantages
include
:
1. the clarity of subsystem interrelation is ex-
pressed by the tree.
2. the fact that the tree can be quantified.
3. enabling the analyst to focus on one particular
undesired event at a time.
4. for constructing meaningful fault trees, the
analyst has to interact with the designers and
operators to fully understand the system. The
insight obtained during this process is of major
benefit to system design, since weaknesses are
spotted and corrected during this period.
5. the graphical representation of the logic struc-
ture provides a visual tool to both the engineers
and management and is useful for justifying
design changes and performing trade off studies.
6. the fault tree, being in essence a top-down
failure mode and effect analysis, lends itself to
23
better organization and control than the conven-
tional failure mode and effect analysis. Because
of the top-down approach, it also offers more
flexibility in terms of termination at any hard-
ware level as well as selectively exploring
certain critical faults in greater depth.
7. the fault tree can be used to obtain minimal cut
sets which define the modes of system failure and
identify critical components. [Ref. 7] Minimal
cut sets are addressed in paragraph G of this
chapter
.
E. DISADVANTAGES OF FAULT TREES
Though there are some general drawbacks to fault
tree analysis, these shortcomings do not adversely
affect the analysis of ORION. Fault tree analysis can
be time consuming, expensive to produce, and include
overwhelming detail for large or complex systems. Since
ORION is to be a low cost, multi-purpose bus, a fault
tree analysis is not necessarily complex or time
consuming. Another general drawback is it requires
considerable effort to include all types of common
cause failures in the fault tree. A fault tree cannot
readily handle priority AND gates and elements in cold
standby. A priority AND gate restricts its inputs to a
specified sequence. ORION has no feature requiring a
priority AND gate and has no component in cold standby.
F. CONSTRUCTION OF A FAULT TREE
There are three groups of symbols commonly used to
construct a fault tree. The three groups presented here






Four kinds of events are represented by the
four symbols in Figure 3.2. A circle represents a
clearly defined failure of a basic component. In con-
trast to the exactness represented by the circle is the
uncertainty associated with a diamond event, which is a
failure not well understood because of absence of
information or significance. Circles are called primary
events and diamonds secondary events. Collectively they
are called bottom events. As such, they are on the
bottom of the tree, have reliabilities associated with
them, and represent the depth of resolution. Normal,
frequently occurring events are symbolized by a house-
shaped figure. An example is the satellite being
eclipsed by the earth. Without sunlight the solar
panels will not generate a voltage. Though no voltage
is considered a failure, this condition is not the
result of a broken panel. Finally, several events
combined together by a logic gate form a combination
event represented by a rectangle. Rectangles are called
gate events. Gate nodes correspond to intermediate





Many different logic gates are used to combine
events, but three simple ones are sufficient. These
three (AND, OR, and INHIBIT) are illustrated in Figure
3.3. Note that the inputs enter from below and the
output comes from the top of the gate. The AND gate
produces an output if all the inputs exist simulta-
neously. The OR gate produces an output when at least
one of the input conditions occur. These two gates are
the same as ordinary usage of the words "and" and "or."
The INHIBIT gate produces output when the input is





Failure undeveloped due to lack of
information or lack of significance
Normally occuring event




Combination of other three events
does not appear at lowest level
of tree
Priority description or restriction
placed on the gate or an












Figure 3.3 Logic Gates
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words, the output is "inhibited" by lack of the stated
condition. The INHIBIT gate can be compared to
FORTRAN'S logical IF statement. The FORTRAN statement
"IF (A .EQ. B) GOTO 1030" states that if the condition
A equals B is satisfied, go to statement number 1030.
If the condition is not satisfied, continue in normal
sequence
.
3 . Special Symbols
Shown in Figure 3.4 are three special symbols
representing parts of trees used to reduce redundancy.
These comprise the last set of symbols presented for
construction of a fault tree.
The hexagon refers to another fault tree which
is substituted where the symbol appears. A good use for
this symbol would be when a particular failure needs
further definition. The detailed tree would be headed
with another hexagon and bear the same label as the
hexagon in the original tree.
To repeat another portion of the same tree, a
pair of triangles is used. The portion of the tree
below the triangle on the left is substituted at the
point where the triangle appears on the right.
The last special symbol (an ellipse) indicates
identical components either in series or parallel. In
this case only one component is mentioned and the
redundancy is shown by an ellipse around the input. The
number of components is written beside the symbol.
G. MINIMAL CUT SETS
A listing of minimal cut sets (or min cut sets or
MCS) is useful for design purposes by helping to
determine the "weakest link(s)" in the system. A cut
set is defined as any set of primary and secondary









To repeat a portion






Figure 3.4 Special Symbols
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A cut set is minimal if it cannot be reduced and still
ensure the occurrence of the top event.
The algorithm used to identify min cut sets is
based on the fact that AND gates always increase the
size of a cut set while an OR gate always increases the
number of cut sets.
The simplest and clearest way to explain the min
cut set algorithm is to illustrate its operation in an
example. The event tree for Example 3.1 is Figure 3.5.
Example 3.1:
The algorithm begins with the gate immediately
below the top event. If the gate is an OR gate, each
input is an entry in separate rows of a list matrix. If
the gate is an AND gate, each input is listed in the
first row of a list matrix. Since the gate immediately
below the top event in Figure 3.5 is an OR gate, the
construction of the list matrix begins with inputs 1,




Since any one of the inputs can cause the top event to
occur, each will be a member of a separate cut set.
The idea of the algorithm is to replace each gate
by its input gates and basic events until a list matrix
is constructed, all of whose entries are basic events.
The rows will then correspond to cut sets.
Since Gl is an OR gate, Gl is replaced by its input

















Since all inputs to an AND gate must occur to cause
the intermediate event above the AND gate, this shows
that an AND gate increases the length of its row. An OR
gate, on the other hand, increases the number of rows
in the list matrix.
Replacing G3 (which is an AND gate) by its inputs,
















Continuing until the list contains only primary or
secondary events the list stops with these (rearranged)
cut sets:
1 6,9 7,9 8,9
2 6,10 7,10 8,10
3 6,11 7,11 8,11
4 6,12 7,12 8,12
5 6,13 7,13 8,13
In this example basic events are not repeated. If
basic events are not repeated all of the cut sets are
minimal cut sets. This means no one cut set is
contained in any other cut set. Generally, if basic
events are repeated in the tree, the algorithm does not
determine only min cut sets. So, when basic events are
repeated somewhere in the tree the list matrix must be
searched to eliminate cut sets which contain other
sets. The final list will then contain only min cut
sets .
32
H. MINIMAL PATH SETS
The dual to a cut set is a path set. Path sets are
identified through the dual event tree and consist of
the events necessary to make the system function rather
than fail. To draw the dual event tree, replace AND
gates with OR gates and OR gates with AND gates in the
original tree. Each event must also be replaced with a
dual description. Failures in the original tree become
successes in the dual (new) tree. In general, the dual
basic events are the non-occurrence of the original
basic events.
As in the cut sets, the focus is on the minimal
path sets. A path set is minimal if it cannot be
further reduced and still insure the top event (now a
system success ) . Min path sets are determined by
applying the same min cut algorithm to the dual (new)
tree .
I. PROBABILITY EVALUATION OF FAULT TREES
To build the mathematical structure necessary to
derive system reliabilities the states of a component
must first be defined. To indicate the state of the i tn
component a binary indicator variable x-^ is assigned to
component i
:
I if component i is functioning
x. = . .
1 [0 if component i is not functioning
where i -= 1,..., n, and n is the number of components
in the system. Additionally, a binary variable
indicates the functioning of the system:
1 if the system is functioning
[0 if the system is not functioning
Since it is assumed that the state of the components
completely determines the state of the system the










The function 4>( x ) is called the structure function of
the system. The number of components (n) in the system
is called the order of the system. As an example, the
structure function of a series of n components is
n
4>(x) = x - min(jc lf ... ,x ).
1 » I 1 n
i = 1
Consistent with above, $ ( x ) is 1 only if all the
components function.
Similarly, for a parallel arrangement of n compo-
nents, the structure function becomes
n




[]*_ = !- n (i-*,).
This returns a value of 1 if there is at least one
functioning component (i.e. 3i: x - 1). Both notations are
consistent with their respective usages in logic.
A k-out-of-n structure functions if and only if at
least k of the n components function. This structure
function is shown by
n





o if y x < k
i = i
Fault trees with AND and OR gates create structure
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functions which are coherent 2 . Then given a coherent
structure ( <}> ) of order n
n
x. < 4>(x) < [} Xi
i =1t = 1
This means a system's performance is bounded below by a
series representation and above by a parallel
representation. [Ref. 8: pp. 6-8]
With the j th (j -If ... » p) min path set P-« , we
P (called the minimal pathmay express a structure p
series structure) with arguments x. , I € p :
p/ x) = n x L •
i e p
j
The structure p is binary and takes on the value 1 if
all the components in the j*-*1 min path set function.
This expression depicts a path set as a series
arrangement of the path set's elements. A system will
function when at least one min path set functions. The
structure function can then be written as
P p
<t>(x) - [] p (x) - 1 - f]
j = i
function can be viewed as a
parallel arrangement of the path sets. This is commonly
referred to as a paral lei -series arrangement.
Similarly, with minimal cut sets, the structure k
(called the minimal parallel cut structure) can be
expressed with arguments x
,
i £ k and j — 1 , . . . , k\
1 - p (x)
j
J =1





2A coherent structure being, roughly, one whose
performance does not deteriorate when failed components
are replaced by functioning ones [Ref. 8: pp. 191.192J.
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which is binary and takes on the value when all the
components in the j""1 min cut set fail, and 1
otherwise
.
Since the system will fail if and only if at least
one of the min cut structures fails, the structure
function can be viewed as a series arrangement of the
cut sets with the elements of a cut set arranged in




This is referred to as a series-parallel arrangement.
Initially, the components are assumed to be statis-
tically independent. If the state of the i tn component
is random (denoted as X-^ ) then
P[X = 1 ) = p = E[X ] for i = 1 n
where E[X] means the expected value of X. The
probability that i functions, p^ , is referred to as the
reliability of component i. In similar fashion, the
reliability of the system is
P[$(X) = I ] = r = £[fJ>(X)] .
The reliability of the k-out-of-n case with









The preceding formula holds under the assumption of
component independence. In reality, this is not usually
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the case. Independence will be replaced with a form of
positive dependence. Components can become positively
dependent in various ways. For example, if a subsystem
has several like-components and one of them fails, the
subsystem remains functional because the remaining
functioning components share the load. Another way
positive dependence is created is when all the
components are subjected to the same stress environ-
ment. The components of ORION fall in this category. If
the reliability of a series arrangement of independent
components is calculated, when in fact they are
associated^, the resultant reliability will be an
underestimate of the true reliability. The opposite
holds for parallel systems. [Ref. 8: pp. 29,32]
The following min-max bounds theorem is presented
in Reference 8, page 37, along with the theorem's
proof
.
Let $ be a coherent structure. Let P^ , P£ » • . • » Pp
be the component min path sets corresponding to $
and let K^ , K2 , . .
.
, K^ be the component min cut sets
corresponding to $ . If components are associated,
then the following bounds hold:
max r—
,
min j yn^ w x > = 1 1 * . < < . Li p il^<p ^ < 1 S<* . iK
r s
Another, equivalent relationship can be expressed in
terms of q^ - 1-Pi- The above bounds now become:
max ,_, min
q < P 4>(X) = 1 < E[<p X) <
:
< s < k l \ ' 1 < r < p L>
5 1
q,
J. IMPORTANCE OF BASIC EVENTS
There are two kinds of component importance. The
first is structure importance and the second is
Association is a particular form of positive
dependence [Ref. 8: p. _lo0] which can be a reasonable
assumption in modelingipti I ORION.
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reliability importance. Before discussing each of
these, the concept and definition of relevance must be
established. The following definition will be used.
The it*1 component is irrelevant to the structure
$
, if $ is constant in x lt that is, <J>(1. , x) = <$>(0 ., x)
,
V( , x) . 4 Otherwise the 1 th component is relevant to
the structure. [Ref. 8: p. 4]
The structure importance of a component focuses on
whether or not a component changes the structure
function from to 1 or from 1 to . In essence, the
structural importance is concerned with only relevant




.t) - 4>(0., x) = 1 for some ( .
,
x).
When this condition exists (l-j^x) is called a critical
path vector for i . Let n (i) denote the total number of
critical path vectors for i. This means
n Ai) = ]T [<t>(l., x) - 4>(0., x)] .
{ x | x. = l
}
This is also the same total number of critical path
sets for i. [Ref. 8:p. 13]
The following is a credible measure of the
structural importance of component i
:
/ (i) = > [$(1 , x) - <J)(0 , x)| .
T n n - 1 — i i2 {x|x. = 1}
This depicts the proportional number of the 2n ~l
outcomes which have x^=l in the critical path vectors
for i. As a result, for any given $ , the components
^ Notation








may be ordered (based on structural importance) by
ordering 1(1),..., I (n) . [Ref. 8:p. 14]
The second type of importance is the component's
reliability importance. This takes into account the
component reliabilities as well as the system
structure. If components can be ranked according to
their importance to the system reliability, this
ranking information can be helpful in determining which
components should have the highest priority for
research and development. This allows managers to
expend effort and money more wisely. [Ref. 8:p. 26]
Intuitively, it would seem a component's
reliability importance could be measured by observing
the rate of change in the system's reliability as the
component's reliability changes. The reliability
importance I r (i) of component i is given by
/ (i) = E[<p(\ , x) - <J>(0 , x)} .
r i l
This definition holds even if the components are
associated. [Ref. 8: pp. 26-27]
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IV. SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Using a copy of the schematics of ORION (Appendix
A) and maintaining a constant interface with the
designers, the ORION fault tree was developed (Appendix
B). Once the fault tree was established the min cut
algorithm was applied to it. This algorithm revealed 82
minimal cut sets. Of these cut sets 22 are single
element sets, 29 are double element cut sets, 27 are
triple element cut sets, 2 are five element cut sets, 1
is a six element cut set and 1 is an eleven element cut
set. Once these cut sets were established, the dual
tree was constructed and the min paths determined.
There are 33,890,503,680 distinct paths, of which the
vast majority is due to the large number of paths
through the solar strings. In general, the paths are
formed by combining the following components:
2 out of 3 attitude detection components
sun sensor
earth sensor
1 out of 4 magnetometers
1 computer
4 out of 6 bubble memory cards each with
functional heater strips and thermistors
1 shunt regulator
1 out of 2 batteries
14 out of 24 solar strings
4 solar connectors
3 out of 4 momentum wheels
1 out of 2 spin up thrusters with a functional
solenoid
1 out of 2 spin down thrusters with a functional
solenoid
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1 out of 2 nutation thrusters with a functional
solenoid
1 orbit insert thruster with a functional solenoid
2 pyrotechnic valves
2 fill and drain valves
2 pressurant tanks
1 hydrazine tank with functioning heaters and
thermistors
Hydrazine line intact with functional heaters and
thermistors
1 out of 2 antennas functioning and deployed
1 combiner/splitter in the TT&C
1 TT&C transceiver
1 TT&C interface hardware
Pressurant line intact
1 heater control hardware
1 bubble storage controller
1 attitude control interface
If the solar strings are considered as a single
module, the number of paths reduces to 17,280. Similar
modular reductions can take place when a subsystem
consists of k out of n like-components. All but the
attitude detection subsystem can be reduced to an
equivalent single component. This reduces the final
number of paths to three.
The three reduced paths were used to calculate the
structural importance of the components. The calcula-
tions reveal seven levels of relative importance in the
following hierarchy (1 being the most relevant):
1. all basic components except those listed below.
(A detailed list is given in Appendix C);
2. a momentum wheel;







5. the sun sensor, the earth sensor, a nutation,
spin up, and spin down thruster with their
functioning solenoids;
6. a battery, an antenna, a hydrazine tank heater
and a thermistor; and
7. a magnetometer.
A schematic of the path sets is at Appendix C.
The reliability importance cannot be specifically
calculated since the actual hardware for several
subsystems has not been defined. A Lotus 1-2-3
spreadsheet was developed so the designers can input
component reliabilities as the subsystems are defined.
The spreadsheet can then calculate the system's
reliability boundaries and components' reliability
importance. The data (i.e. component failure rates) for
inclusion in the spreadsheet come from two major
sources, JPL TR 32-1505 and MILSTD 217D. The spread-
sheet identifies the lower boundary as the most
reliable path and the upper boundary as the least
reliable cut. The number of paths to compare is
significantly reduced by using a modular approach (i.e.
using the binomial distribution to calculate the
reliability of a k out of n subsystem). Such a
reduction allows the problem to be handled by a
spreadsheet. Even in a reduced form, the model
maintains the ability to discern an impact on the
system reliability when changing, for example, only a
solar string's reliability. The spreadsheet is then





Throughout the analysis, it became apparent that
the fault tree is a "living" document. It must be
maintained to reflect the existing design if it is to
aid in the design process. The fault tree can help
explain the cause of a failure after design is complete
and the system is on station, but only if the fault
tree reflects the current design. Aiding in the design,
and determination of a failure after system employment
are strong motives to maintain the fault tree. This
thesis includes sufficient background so maintenance
can be done to insure the longevity of the fault tree.
A total of 82 cut sets were determined and the
components' structural importance derived. The
information can be used to help focus research and
budget efforts.
Lastly, a spreadsheet was developed to model the
system's reliability boundaries as well as component
reliability importance.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
There are five recommendations based upon the fault
tree analysis. They are:
1. as each subsystem is developed, conduct a
detailed fault tree analysis of that subsystem.
2. after a subsystem is constructed, conduct a
circuit stress analysis of each component and the
subsystem.
3. as the design may change, maintain the fault
tree
.
4. for electrical components, use the designing
engineer's reliability based diagram to help
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construct the fault tree. If a diagram is not
available, request one be made.
5. focus research and budget attention on those
components listed with the highest structural and
reliability importance.
Due to ORION'S design to be low cost and
reconfigurable , ORION is an excellent candidate for
constellation proliferation. A logical follow-on study





The enclosed schematics were used to develop the
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The large fault tree developed is broken into small
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ORION PATH AND CUT SETS
Use of the min cut algorithm produced 82 minimal
cut sets. Their basic component designation and
description are listed below:
Single Element Cut Sets
Yl Attitude control interface electronics
Y3 Data storage controller
Y13 Heater control hardware
Y14 Computer
Y15 Shunt regulator
Y42 Propulsion interface electronics
Y43 Hydrazine line
Y44 Hydrazine line heater
Y45 Hydrazine line thermistor
Y46 Pressurant line
Y47 Hydrazine tank
Y52 and Y53 Fill and drain valve
Y54 and Y55 Pressurant tank
Y56 and Y57 Pyrotechnic valve
Y66 Orbit thruster
Y67 Orbit thruster heater
Y74 TT&C combiner splitter
Y75 TT&C transceiver hardware
Y76 TT&C interface hardware
Double Element Cut Sets
Y2 , Y31 Sun sensor and earth sensor
Y16, Y17 Both batteries
Y23, Y24 Two solar array connectors
Y36 , Y37 Two momentum wheels
Y38, Y39 Y38, Y41 Any pair of thrusters
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Y39, Y40 Y40, Y41 (spin up, spin down or
Y58, Y59 Y58, Y61 nutation) disabled by a
Y59, Y60 Y60, Y61 combination of the
Y62, Y63 Y62, Y65 thruster or its heater
Y63, Y64 Y64, Y65 failing and a similar
failure on the coupled
thruster
.
Y48, Y50 Y48, Y51 Any combination of the
Y49, Y50 Y49, Y51 heaters and thermistors
on the hydrazine tank.
Y68, Y71 Y68, Y72 Any combination of an
Y68, Y73 Y69, Y71 antenna, an antenna
Y69, Y72 Y69, Y73 connector, or antenna
Y70, Y71 Y70, Y72 deployment with the
Y70, Y73 similar events of the
other antenna.
Triple Element Cut Sets
All of these cut sets are any combination of a
bubble memory card, its heater or its thermistor with
the similar events on any other two bubble memory
cards
.
Y4 , Y5, Y6 Y4 , Y5 , Y9 Y4 , Y5 , Y12
Y4 , Y8, Y6 Y4 , Y8 , Y9 Y4 , Y8 , Y12
Y4 , Yll, Y6 Y4 , Yll, Y9 Y4 , Yll, Y12
Y7 , Y5, Y6 Y7, Y5 , Y9 Y7 , Y5 , Y12
Y7, Y8, Y6 Y7, Y8 , Y9 Y7 , Y8 , Y12
Y7 , Yll, Y6 Y7, Yll, Y9 Y7 , Yll, Y12
Y10, Y5 , Y6 Y10, Y5 , Y9 Y10, Y5 , Y12
Y10, Y8, Y6 Y10, Y8 , Y9 Y10, Y8 , Y12
Y10, Yll, Y6 Y10, Yll, Y9 Y10, Yll, Y12
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Five Element Cut Sets
Y2
,
Y32 , Y33, Y34 , Y35 The sun sensor and all
four magnetometers
Y31, Y32, Y33, Y34 , Y35 The earth sensor and all
four magnetometers
Six Element Cut Set
Y18, Y19, Y20, Y21, Y22 , Y23 One solar array
and any five solar strings from the
remaining 18
Eleven Element Cut Set
Y18, Y19, Y20, Y21, Y22 , Y25 , Y26 , Y27 , Y28 , Y29 , Y30
Any combination of 11 solar strings from the 24
The following components were determined to have
the highest structural importance.
- Computer
- Shunt regulator
- Solar array connectors
- Heater control hardware
- Hydrazine tank
- Hydrazine line
- Hydrazine line heater
- Hydrazine line thermistor
- Pressurant tanks
- Pressurant line
- Fill and drain valves
- Propulsion interface electronics
- Orbit thruster
- Orbit thruster heater
- Attitude control iterface
- Data storage controller
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- TT&C combiner splitter
- TT&C transceiver hardware























The enclosed listing of a Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet
was converted to a MathPlan 3.0 format for inclusion in
this Appendix. It contains the elements necessary to do
a "what-if" analysis. As the subsystems are designed
and constructed, their reliabilities can be placed in











































V5 - V6 W [V3]
W5 = W6+U5»*V5
X5 - X[6]*X[3]
Y5 = Y6+[U]5 M X5
AC5 = AC6*[AB1]




AL5 = l-( (1-[AG5] ) w ( 1-[AI5] )*«(1-[AK5] ) )















































































































































































































































AD14 = AD15 + (AB14*AC14 )









AI15 = L00KUP( ( [G18]-[ J18]+l ) , [Y10] : [T14]
)







R16 = 1-((1-[016] )*(1-[Q16] ))






AI16 - LOOKUP( ( [G18]-[ J18]+l ) ,[Y10] : [T14]
)













































AI20 = L00KUP([J7] ,[T10]:[Z14]
)
AL20 = l-( (1-[AI20] )*(1-[AG20] )
)
AN20 = [B84]
















































































































































































































































L59 = l-( (1-[012] )*(1-[Q12] )
)




L60 = l-( (1-[AG9] )»(1-[AI9] )**(1-[AK9] ) )







L62 = 1-((1-[014] )*(1-[Q14] )
B63 = [D18]
L63 = l-( (1-EAI20] )*(1-[AG20] )
)
B64 = [D33]
L64 = 1-((1-[013] )*(1-[Q13] ) )
B65 = [D34]




L66 = l-( (1-[015] )*(1-[Q15] ) )
B67 = MAX( [G78]
,
[G83]
L67 = l-( (1-CAG10] )*(1-[AI10] )*(1-[AK10]))
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